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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Wade Peterson's conviction for felony possession of a controlled substance was 
vacated on appeal, and the district court accordingly directed dismissal of this charge. 
However, relying on the recent Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in Hooper v. State1, the 
district court incorrectly believed that it lacked personal jurisdiction to entertain the 
merits of Mr. Peterson's motion seeking reimbursement of funds that he had previously 
paid out to the clerk of the district court in connection with this conviction - even though 
there was no evidence in this case that these funds had actually been disbursed, much 
less that these funds had already been given to any agency outside of the court. 
The holding in Hooper is limited to those cases where there is evidence that the 
funds at issue had been disbursed to an outside agency that is not a party to the case 
or otherwise subject to the court's inherent supervisory authority. There is no such 
evidence in this case. As such, the district court abused its discretion in finding that it 
lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Mr. Peterson's motion. Accordingly, he asks that this 
Court vacate the district court's order denying his motion for reimbursement, and 
remand this case for further proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
This appeal arises from the denial of Mr. Peterson's motion seeking 
reimbursement for funds he had paid for restitution, fines, and other related costs upon 
his underlying conviction being vacated by the Idaho Supreme Court. The background 
1 Hooper v. State, 150 Idaho 497 (2011 ). 
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procedural facts surrounding Mr. Peterson's prior criminal case were summarized as 
follows by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
On August 20, 2003, Peterson was arrested for possession of a controlled 
substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, unlawful possession of a 
firearm, carrying a concealed weapon, possession of illegal fireworks, and 
illegal possession of prescription drugs. Pursuant to this arrest the State 
seized weapons from Peterson's van, including two firearms and a 
baseball bat. The Ada County Prosecutor's Office filed a complaint against 
Peterson, and a preliminary hearing was held before the magistrate court 
on September 2, 2003. At that hearing, the magistrate dismissed the count 
of felony possession of a controlled substance, as the State had failed to 
obtain a lab report within the set time limits, telling the prosecutor that the 
charge could be re-filed if a lab report was obtained. At Peterson's video 
arraignment for the misdemeanor charges, for possession of drug 
paraphernalia and carrying a concealed weapon, on September 3, 2003, 
the Ada County Prosecutor's Office sought to amend the complaint to 
reinstate the dismissed felony possession of a controlled substance 
charge. The magistrate denied this requested amendment and told the 
prosecutor that the prosecutor could re-file the charge as a new complaint, 
but could not amend the original complaint. On September 16, 2003, a 
new criminal complaint was filed against Peterson for felony possession of 
a controlled substance, and a probable cause hearing was conducted 
before a magistrate, during which the prosecutor told the magistrate that 
the State intended to amend the complaint containing the felony 
possession of a controlled substance charge to add the two 
misdemeanors charges, and then issue a summons for Peterson. 
At a pretrial conference on the original misdemeanor case on October 30, 
2003, the magistrate judge asked whether the felony charge had been re-
filed, as the magistrate was concerned that the misdemeanor charges 
may have been incidental to the felony if it were re-filed. Peterson's 
attorney indicated that he was unaware of any re-filing, and the prosecutor 
expressed that, to the best of her knowledge, the misdemeanor charges 
were the only charges pending against Peterson. On December 1, 2003, 
Peterson appeared before a magistrate and entered into an oral Rule 11 
plea bargain with the State, wherein Peterson pied guilty to the 
misdemeanor concealed weapon charge, and the remaining charge under 
that complaint, misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, was 
dismissed. 
Following Peterson's completion of probation for the concealed weapon 
charge, a warrant was issued for Peterson on the felony possession of a 
controlled substance charge on July 8, 2004. On February 18, 2005, on 
arraignment before a magistrate, Peterson stated that it was his 
understanding that the possession of a controlled substance charge had 
been dismissed in 2003. On May 27, 2005, Peterson filed a Motion to 
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Dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, claiming that the possession of a 
controlled substance charge had already been disposed of by the plea 
agreement entered on December 1, 2003. Following a hearing before the 
district court on July 14, 2005, this motion was denied on September 6, 
2005. On May 2, 2006, Peterson entered a conditional A/ford2 plea of 
guilty on the charge of possession of a controlled substance. Peterson 
was given a suspended sentence of seven years with two years fixed on 
June 6, 2006, and Peterson filed a Notice of Appeal on the same day. 
On November 6, 2006, Peterson made a motion to the district court for a 
release of some of his property that was seized pursuant to the August 20, 
2003, arrest. The district court denied this motion on November 21, 2006, 
based upon the State's notification that it intended to file a motion to 
confiscate the property. The State filed a Motion for Confiscation of 
Firearms/Contraband on December 7, 2006, and Peterson filed an 
Objection to IVlotion for Confiscation and Claim of Property on December 
8, 2006. On February 6, 2007, a hearing was conducted before the district 
court and an Order for Confiscation of Firearms and Contraband was 
issued on February 9, 2007. On March 19, 2007, the district court allowed 
Peterson to testify regarding the confiscation order, as Peterson had not 
been present at the February 6, 2007, hearing, and it was unclear whether 
Peterson had received notice of that hearing. After Peterson's testimony, 
the district court issued an Order Denying Defendant's Motion to 
Reconsider on April 9, 2007. Peterson filed a Notice of Appeal on April 13, 
2007. 
State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 594-95 (2010). 
Importantly, the district court in the underlying criminal case ordered several 
financial penalties against Mr. Peterson - including court costs and fees, public 
defender reimbursement, a fine that constituted the majority of Mr. Peterson's financial 
obligations, and restitution. (R., p.18; 35786 R., p.58.) The total amount Mr. Peterson 
was ordered to pay as a result of his felony conviction was $1,764.50. (R., p.18.) 
On appeal, the Peterson Court ultimately determined that Mr. Peterson had 
entered into a prior plea agreement with the State for other misdemeanor charges, and 
this prior agreement was deemed to have encompassed all other charges related to the 
underlying conduct - including the felony conviction of possession of a controlled 
substance. Peterson, 148 Idaho at 595-597. The Court in Peterson therefore vacated 
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Mr. Peterson's felony conviction and likewise vacated an order confiscating 
Mr. Peterson's weapons that was entered pursuant to the felony possession of a 
controlled substance conviction that was vacated by the Court. Id. at 597. 
Upon remand, the district court properly dismissed Mr. Peterson's conviction for 
felony possession of a controlled substance, as well as the confiscation order. 
(R., pp.12-13.) Thereafter, Mr. Peterson filed a motion for reimbursement for the "fines, 
fees, costs and restitution" that he had already paid out due to his felony conviction. 
(R., pp.15-18.) The records appended to this motion indicated that Mr. Peterson had 
already paid $520 towards these fines, fees, and costs. (R., pp.17-18.) However, none 
of the records provided to Mr. Peterson indicated whether the funds he remitted were 
actually disbursed by the clerk of the district court, nor did the records show where any 
disbursement was made. (R., pp.17-18.) 
A hearing was held on the record on Mr. Peterson's motion. (Tr., p.4, L.4 - p.11, 
L.8.) Mr. Peterson clarified that, in his motion, he was only seeking reimbursement for 
money that he paid towards fines, fees, and restitution - not any amounts that were also 
paid out for probation supervision fees. (Tr., p.4, L.22 - p.5, L.9.) The State responded 
that Mr. Peterson would have to seek reimbursement of the money he had paid through 
a civil action, and asserted that the necessary parties were not before the district court 
at the time. (Tr., p.5, Ls.12-25.) The State claimed that money paid towards restitution 
went to an agency outside of the district court or the prosecutor's office, but also 
claimed the same was true with regard to the criminal fine that was imposed on 
Mr. Peterson as a result of his now-vacated felony conviction. (Tr., p.5, Ls.12-25.) The 
prosecutor did not submit any evidence to show that any of the funds Mr. Peterson paid 
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were disbursed at all by the clerk of the district court, much less that these funds went to 
agencies outside of the court. (Tr., p.5, Ls.12-25.) 
The district court expressed skepticism at the State's suggestion that 
Mr. Peterson could never have any recourse in his criminal case in order to obtain 
reimbursement for money paid out as a direct penalty for his vacated conviction. 
(Tr., p.6, L.1 - p.8, L.12.) However, the district court held off on issuing any order on 
Mr. Peterson's motion during this hearing in the hopes that the parties could negotiate a 
resolution on the matter. 2 (Tr., p.9, L.22 - p.11, L.6.) No such resolution was reached. 
(R., p.23.) 
The district court thereafter denied Mr. Peterson's motion, citing to the recent 
Idaho Supreme Court opinion in Hooper. (R., pp.22-24.) In light of this Opinion, the 
district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to grant the reimbursement requested 
by Mr. Peterson. (R., pp.22-24.) Mr. Peterson timely appeals from the district court's 
order denying his motion for reimbursement. (R., p.26.) 
2 The register of actions for this case reflects that a second status hearing was held in 
chambers in the hopes of negotiating a resolution. However, according to the register 
of actions, this "hearing," held on March 8, 2011, was held in chambers and there is no 
record of the contents of this hearing. (R., p.8.) According to the district court's order 
denying Mr. Peterson's motion for reimbursement, this meeting was solely an attempt to 
negotiate a resolution between the parties on Mr. Peterson's motion. (R., p.23.) 
However, no resolution was reached. (R., p.23.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err in finding that it lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Peterson's motion 
seeking reimbursement of funds paid as a result of his conviction that was vacated by 




The District Court Erred In Finding That It Lacked Jurisdiction Over Mr. Peterson's 
Motion Seeking Reimbursement Of Funds Paid As A Result Of His Conviction That Was 
Vacated By The Idaho Supreme Court, And Thereafter Denying Mr. Peterson's Motion 
For Reimbursement 
Mr. Peterson brought his motion for reimbursement following the vacation of his 
underlying criminal conviction, and sought reimbursement in the underlying criminal 
case for payments he had previously made for "fines, fees, costs and restitution" within 
that case. (R., pp.15-18.) The district court erroneously believed that it lacked 
jurisdiction to entertain the merits of this motion. Because the district court failed to 
recognize its discretion to entertain the merits of Mr. Peterson's motion, he asks that 
this Court vacate the district court's order denying his motion for reimbursement and 
remand this case for further proceedings. 
As an initial matter, the district court made a finding of fact that is unsupported by 
any evidence in the record. The district court, in its order denying Mr. Peterson's motion 
for reimbursement, found that, "The distribution of the $520 [Mr. Peterson] paid was 
set forth as an attachment on his Motion for Reimbursement." (R., p.23 (emphasis 
added).) However, there is no evidence as to how the money paid by Mr. Peterson as a 
result of the court's order was distributed by the clerk of the district court, or that it was 
actually distributed at all. (R., pp.17-18.) What Mr. Peterson's evidence showed was 
the total amount of financial liability that was ordered in his underlying felony case, and 
the amount of the payments that were made by him to the clerk of the district court. 
(R., pp.17-18.) And this is a distinction that is particularly critical to this case based 
upon the trial court's reliance on the Hooper Opinion. 
In Hooper, the defendant's conviction had been vacated on appeal. Hooper v. 
State, 150 Idaho 497, 498 (2011 ). At the time his conviction was vacated, the 
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defendant had paid approximately $293 towards the restitution, costs, and fees that 
were awarded on the basis of that conviction. Id. Mr. Hooper appealed the district 
court's refusal to order reimbursement of these payments. Id. at 499. 
The Hooper Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the 
necessary parties to adjudicate this motion. Id. However, the Court did so due to facts 
that are not present in this case. In particular, the evidence presented at the hearing on 
Mr. Hooper's motion seeking the return of money that he had paid out demonstrated 
that the funds he paid had already been disbursed - and that this money was paid out 
to a particular agency outside of the district court and not to any of the parties of the 
underlying criminal proceeding. Id. at 498-499. 
Specifically, the money paid by the defendant in Hooper was shown under the 
evidence in that case to have been disbursed specifically to the Idaho Industrial 
Commission, which is an executive agency that oversees the Victim Account where 
restitution funds are kept. Id. at 499. Because the funds paid by the defendant in 
Hooper were shown, under the evidence, to have been paid out by the clerk of the 
district court to an outside agency that was not a party to the underlying criminal case, 
the Hooper Court held that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Idaho 
Industrial Commission to order the return of this money. Id. at 499-500. 
This case has no such evidence. It is clear under the evidence that Mr. Peterson 
paid $520 towards the total amounts ordered pursuant to his now-vacated felony 
conviction. (R., pp.17-18.) However, there is no evidence as to where these moneys 
were disbursed - or even that they were disbursed by the clerk of the district court at all. 
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The amounts that Mr. Peterson was ordered to pay for restitution, fines, and fees 
were listed as part of the evidence he submitted in conjunction with his motion for 
reimbursement. (R., p.18.) The financial obligations were as follows: 
(1) $1,000 for a criminal fine (with an additional $1,000 suspended) 
(2) $6.00 POST Fee 
(3) $50 for victim's compensation 
(4) $500 for public defender costs 
(5) $16 in total handling fees 
(6) $60 in Community Service Insurance 
(7) $10 for administrative surcharges 
(8) $5 towards the !STARS Tech Fund 
(9) $17.50 in court costs 
( 10) $100 for restitution 
(R.,p.18) 
In this case, it is not clear that the amounts ordered went to agencies outside of 
the district court itself or the parties before the court in Mr. Peterson's underlying 
criminal case. More important, there was no evidence that the funds paid out by 
Mr. Peterson ever were disbursed by the clerk of the district court at all. This is 
significant, because the district court has supervisory authority of the clerk of the district 
court. 
The clerk of the district court is an office contained within the judiciary branch of 
government in Idaho. See Crooks v. Maynard, 112 Idaho 312, 314 (1987). Prior to the 
establishment of the clerk of the district court as an elected office under Article V, § 16 
of the Idaho State Constitution, these clerks were actually appointed by the judge of a 
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particular judicial district and were subject to their control. Id. However, even though 
this position is now attained by election rather than judicial appointment, clerks of the 
district court are still subject to the supervision of both the administrative judge and 
other district court judges of the judicial district that the clerk serves with regard to the 
performance of judicial functions. Id. at 314-319. 
In light of this, the district court in this case had inherent authority over the clerk 
of the district court to order the return of any money that IVlr. Peterson paid that had not 
yet been disbursed. In light of this, there would be no jurisdictional issue such as was 
at issue in Hooper if these funds had not yet been disbursed. Moreover, the lion's share 
of the financial penalties that were awarded against Mr. Peterson due to his now-
vacated conviction came in the form of a criminal fine, which is paid - almost in its 
entirety - directly to the district court. And, contrary to the representations of the State, 
the district court did have jurisdiction to order reimbursement for Mr. Peterson's criminal 
fine. 
Idaho Code § 19-4705 governs payment and disbursement for fines awarded as 
a result of a criminal conviction. See I.C. § 19-4705. This statute also provides, in 
pertinent part, how the fines collected are to be disbursed. Nearly all of the amounts 
paid towards criminal fines such as the one awarded in this case are actually retained 
by the district court: 
(d) Fines and forfeitures remitted for violation of any state law not involving 
fish and game laws, or motor vehicle laws, or state driving privilege laws, 
or state laws prohibiting driving while under the influence of alcohol, drugs 
or any other intoxicating substances, shall be apportioned ten percent 
(10%) to the state treasurer of which eighty-six percent (86%) shall be 
deposited to the state general fund and fourteen percent (14%) shall be 
deposited to the peace officers standards and training fund authorized in 
section 19-5116, Idaho Code, and ninety percent (90%) to the district 
court fund of the county in which the violation occurred. 
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I.C. § 19-4705 (d) (emphasis added). 
Therefore, at least 90% of any amounts paid out by Mr. Peterson that were 
allocated to the criminal fines of $1000 that was awarded against him were retained by 
the district court and were not disbursed to an outside agency such as would present 
any issue regarding personal jurisdiction. As previously noted, the district court has 
inherent supervisory authority over the clerk of the district court, who received the 
money paid by Mr. Peterson towards this fine. Accordingly, the district court erred to 
the extent that the court believed it lacked the jurisdiction to reimburse Mr. Peterson for 
any funds he paid towards ~1is criminal fine. See People v. Nance, 542 N.W.2d 358, 
359-360 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that district court erred when it denied 
defendant's motion for reimbursement of money paid towards criminal fines for 
conviction that was subsequently overturned). 
In fact, the jurisdictional bar to the recovery of restitution in Hooper is also not 
present in this case. Because Hooper did not involve a drug offense under I.C. § 37-
2732, the restitution that was awarded in Hooper would appear to be ordered pursuant 
to Idaho's general restitution statute, I.C. § 19-5304. Hooper, 150 Idaho at 749-751. 
However, l\/lr. Peterson's underlying offense was possession of a controlled substance, 
and the record indicates that there was no purported "victim" of this offense such as 
would qualify under the provisions of the general restitution statute. (See 33137 
Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.1-2.) In light of the nature of 
Mr. Peterson's charge and the fact that there was no alleged "victim" of his drug 
possession, it appears that his restitution was not awarded as general restitution under 
I.C. § 19-5304, but was awarded under I.C. § 37-2732(k) as financial recoupment to the 
prosecutor and to police for the investigation and prosecution of his drug offense. 
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The Idaho Industrial Commission does not oversee or disburse the restitution 
funds recouped under I.C. § 37-2732(k) - those funds go directly to the prosecutor, the 
police, or to the attorney general who is awarded the restitution. See I.C. § 37-2732(k); 
see also I.C. § 72-1001 et seq. 3 The record in this case does not disclose what 
proportion of the drug restitution award went directly to the prosecutor in this case. 
However, whatever proportion of the $100 awarded as restitution in this case that was 
disbursed to the prosecutor is properly within the district court's jurisdiction to 
reimburse. See Hooper, 150 Idaho at 751 (noting that the prosecutor is the "alter ego" 
of the State in the prosecution of criminal offenses). Therefore, the district court erred 
to the extent that it held that it lacked the jurisdiction to reimburse Mr. Peterson for any 
amount of reimbursement to the prosecutor under the award of restitution under 
I.C. § 37-2732(k) in this case. 
The record in this case does not reveal that the funds paid by Mr. Peterson were 
ever disbursed by the clerk of the district court, and therefore there is no evidence that 
would support the district court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to grant 
Mr. Peterson's motion for reimbursement. Moreover, any amounts collected as a fine 
against Mr. Peterson would remain almost entirely with the district court, and the district 
court had the inherent authority to order the clerk of the district court to return this 
amount without any jurisdictional issue. Additionally, even the restitution that was 
3 Given that the record shows that there was no alleged "victim" in this case flowing from 
Mr. Peterson's former conviction for possession of a controlled substance, the Idaho 
Industrial Commission would likewise have no authority to award any compensation 
under the Crime Victims Compensation Act, as the commission only has authority to 
award compensation to those who fall under the act's definition of a "victim," and then 
only for statutorily recognized losses for actual "injury" from the defendant's offense. 
See I.C. §§ 72-1003, 72-1016, 72-1018. This is yet further evidence from the record 
that the restitution awarded in Mr. Peterson's underlying criminal case was awarded 
under the drug restitution provisions contained in I.C. § 37-2732(k). 
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awarded in this case was awarded as recoupment of the State's costs of investigation 
and prosecution. At the least, to the extent that these funds may have been paid to the 
prosecutor in this case, then there is no jurisdictional problem in the district court 
ordering that Mr. Peterson be reimbursed for that award. 
The district court therefore erred when it held, as a blanket proposition, that it 
lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Mr. Peterson's motion for reimbursement. In doing so, 
the district court also failed to recognize its own discretion in adjudicating the merits of 
Mr. Peterson's motion. As such, Mr. Peterson asks that this Court reverse the district 
court's order denying his motion for reimbursement and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Peterson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion for reimbursement, and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 23rd day of November, 2011. 
SARAH E. TOIVIPKINS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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